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Human Consent 
An examination of the bond of fidelity which must 
exist between physician and patient in order to 
achieve consent to medical procedure. 
Rev. Clarence Deddens 
Father Deddens of the Arch-
diocese of St. Louis, prepared 
this article while a candidate for 
his S. T.L. and S. T.D. at the Pon-
tifical Angelicum and Gregorian 
Universities in Rome. 
Informed consent is a statement of fidelity which exists in the 
medical context between the person who practices medicine and the 
person upon whom medicine is practiced. This fidelity exists between 
two persons, and the relationship thus formed can perdure only as 
long as the consent perdures. The withdrawal of consent eliminates 
that particular relationship. It is my general impression that this prin-
ciple of consent is usually understood as the consent of the patient to 
the advice of the physician; however, I think it important to under-
stand that this relationship between patient and physician is not a 
unilateral one, but a bilateral one. Thus, the consent of the physician 
to whatever course is finally settled upon is equally as important as 
the consent of the patient. 
A word must be said here about the application of this to the two 
general areas of medical practice: experimentation and therapy. In the 
first area, that of medical experimentation, the purpose of this rela-
tionship of consent is the advancement of medicine and, therefore, 
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benefit to others. In the second area, that of therapy or healing, the 
purpose of the relation of consent is some benefit to the patient 
himself. In each case, both patient and physician join in the final 
product, that is, curing. Both consent, and both succeed or fail. 1 
This relationship between patient and physician is very much like 
what we understand as "covenant," in that it is an enterprise which 
requires a reasonably free and adequately formed consent, and it must 
be something ongoing. 2 
Dr. Paul Ramsey, who has written extensively on this subject, is 
fond of using Abraham Lincoln's quote that "No man is good enough 
to govern another without his consent," and applying it to this area by 
formulating the following: "No man is good enough to cure another 
without his consent."3 I think Catholic moralists can easily agree with 
Dr. Ramsey that this holds without exception for ordinary medical 
practice, understanding the special requirements for children as well as 
the famous "Good Samaritan" laws where consent, if not informed, is 
at least implied. It seems, however, that even these are currently being 
threatened in the United States by the current paranoia over mal-
practice. 
It is easy to see that in the area of research or medical investigation, 
the necessity of a reasonably free and adequately formed consent is 
the great safeguard which will protect the patient from the overly 
adventurous physician or medical investigation. This insight has been 
articulated in the various codes and declarations of the last 30 years : 
the Nuremberg Code (1947); Declaration of Geneva (1948, amended 
in 1968); Declaration of Helsinki (1964); Declaration of Sydney 
(1968); Declaration of Oslo (1970); and the Declaration of Tokyo 
(1975).4 To this list most physicians, and particularly Catholic phy-
sicians, would want to add the various addresses of Pope Pius XII on 
these subjects, especially those in 1952 and 1953. 5 
A detailed examination of each of these codes is not within the 
scope of this article, although it would be an interesting study. It 
should be observed, however, that many of these declarations advance 
very well the cause of the principle of consent. 
Leaving aside the thornier problems of consent in the area of re-
search or medical investigation, it is my purpose to deal with a neg-
lected parameter of consent in the area of therapy and examine the 
consent required of both patient and physician in the actual process of 
healing. We have already accepted above Dr. Ramsey's formulation-
a formulation, incidentally, shared by many others - that the patient 
is to be reasonably free and adequately informed before he can give 
consent. Traditional moral theology in the Catholic Church might find 
a parallel in this by remembering the classical moral dictum of the 
obligation to follow not the conscience, but a properly informed con-
science. This suggests the question: What can be said about the con-
science of the physician versus the conscience of the patient? 
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Once a doctor has done his duty in discussing the prospect of 
success of a certain treatment or surgical intervention he will, after 
sufficient dialogue in which he attempts to allow the patient to come 
to a proper understanding, abide by the decision of the patient or of 
those persons morally and legally responsible. 6 
Decision Sometimes Difficult 
In some situations, this decision is difficult to accept for the physi-
cian and this is precisely the burden of our analysis in the present 
paper. One can quote here the classic example of the fully conscious 
adult patient who refuses a blood transfusion in accordance with the 
teaching of his religious sect. Must the physician abide by the patient's 
request to let him die? Also, the physician often finds himself in 
disagreement with his patient on some moral principle or its applica-
tion. Here again, another classic example can be quoted of the doctor 
who, convinced that sterilization is the only reasonable approach to an 
illness finds that he must respect the moral conviction of the patient 
who is convinced that such sterilization is absolutely immoral. A third 
classic case is the duty of the physician who must give his patient 
proper health care even when he morally disapproves of the life situa-
tion in which the patient contracted the illness, for example, venereal 
disease contracted by a prostitute. 
Here is where our point comes to focus. Just as the physician must 
respect the patient's conscience, so does the patient incur the same 
obligation towards his physician. A patient would be violating the 
relationship of fidelity by requesting a treatment which he knows to 
be against his doctor's conscience. There are cases in which the physi-
cian has a well-informed and firm conviction of conscience that a 
certain treatment or intervention is both immoral and harmful to the 
patient's well-being. He should expose the facts clearly. If the patient 
is unwilling to agree with the physician then the covenant of fidelity is 
rendered impossible, and the physician has no recourse but to with-
draw from the case. The argument that the patient will nevertheless 
obtain what he wants from some other physician would never justify 
an action which is against the physician's conscience. In such a situa-
tion, the physician of sincerity and integrity would see the medical 
procedure as damaging to the ethical and moral good of the patient, 
and thus not for the greater good of the patient. Thus, the covenanted 
fidelity would dissolve itself in blocking the physician's consent to 
administer therapy. 
How can the conscience of the physician be more important than 
his first and foremost task, that of healing? Why is the consent of the 
patient so important that it supersedes even the advice of the physi-
cian who obviously knows better? For what reason is a person allowed 
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to ignore the evidence of medical knowledge in favor of what one 
accepts as the particular beliefs of one's religious sect? In the last 
analysis, is the physician a moralist or a doctor? 
The answers to these questions, of course, lie in the superior respect 
which is accorded to the conscience both by ethics as well as by 
morality. This respect finds official approbation in the latest version 
of t he "Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities" 
by the United States Catholic Conference when it says: "No person 
may be obliged to take part in a medical or surgical procedure which 
he judges in conscience to be immoral; nor maya health facility or 
any of its staff be obliged to provide a medical or surgical procedure 
which violates their conscience or these Directives."7 The Fathers of 
Vatican II touched this basic idea even more deeply, and in a more 
general con text, when they said" ... that which is truly freedom is an 
exceptional sign of the image of God in man .... Man's dignity there-
fore requires him to act out of conscious and free choice . ... 
(Gaudium et Spes, 17). 8 
Proposal of Solution 
As helpful as these guides are however, they do not give flesh and 
blood to the everyday problems of conscience which arise between 
physician and patient, patient and health care facility, and physician 
and health care facility. I would like to propose that a possible solu-
tion lies in the fact that sickness is to be understood not only as 
something physical but also as something emotional, moral and even 
spiritual. The physician must ask himself what, if any, second sickness 
does he create by healing the first sickness. The physician whose con-
science is tortured by the fact that he cannot perform a blood trans-
fusion on a patient who refuses it on religious pretexts must further 
inquire into his conscience whether or not he wants to force the blood 
transfusion and cure the first sickness, but then, in the process, create 
a second sickness in the patient who finds himself tortured because he 
violated his understanding of God's law. Likewise, a physician whose 
conscience tells him that artificial birth regulation is the only advisable 
course must also ask himself if, in his intentions to alleviate suffering, 
he is not at the same time unwittingly contributing to a vicious non-
child mentality. 
Basically, unless the curing process is truly human, the cured be-
comes less human . The temptation to abuse the curing process because 
of a mentality of consumerism or a desire for instant happiness can 
cause the conscience to become less free. We must understand that the 
medical process, committed as it is to health, must subject the concept 
of physical health to the greater concept of total health , that health 
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which is sufficient not only for physicial happiness but also, and most 
importantly, for eternal happiness. 
As a fellow pilgrim with the patient, the physician quite properly 
sees as his province the total happiness - not merely the physical 
happiness - of the patient. Conflicts of conscience will therefore be 
resolved from this basis in covenant. Perhaps Dr. Ramsey's formula-
tion must be amended to read: adequately informed, reasonably free, 
and totally human consent. 
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